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STANDARD FOR EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 1975)
Petitioner sought reversal of his conviction' for first degree murder,2
claiming that he had been denied his sixth amendment right to effec-
tive' legal assistance because of his attorney's incompetence. The trial
court refused to appoint counsel or grant an evidentiary hearing. 4 The
I. Petitioner's conviction and 99 year sentence were affirmed by the court of
criminal appeals, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied certiorari. Baxter v. Rose,
523 S.W.2d 930, 931 (Tenn. 1975).
2. The po se petition was filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction Procedure Act,
TENN. CODE AN,. § 40-3801 (1975). Section 40-3805 provides:
Relief under this chapter shall be granted when the conviction or sentence is
void or voidable because of the abridgment in any way of any right guaranteed
by the constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States, includ-
ing a right that was not recognized as existing at the time of the trial if either
constitution requires retrospective application of that right.
Many other states provide for similar post-conviction relief. See, e.g., Post Conviction
Hearing Act, PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 19-1180 (Purdon 1966). Most effectiveness chal-
lenges arise under a petition for habeas corpus. For discussion of the use of habeas
corpus in competence challenges, see Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in
Criminal Cases: Departures from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REv. 927 (1973). The
challenge may also arise in a motion for a new trial. See, e.g., United States v. Katz,
425 F,2d 928 (2d Cir. 1970). The defendant may allege incompetence during trial, but
some courts hold it improper for the trial judge to investigate and correct the inadequacy
of counsel. See, e.g., State v. Dee, 218 N.W.2d 561 (Iowa 1974).
Direct appeal is another possible avenue of challenge, although an attorney is unlikely
to attack his own competence. See notes 20-23 infra. This is one of the reasons that
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia appoints different counsel to file ap-
peals for convicted indigents. See Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U.
CN. L. REv. 1, 5 (1973).
3. Courts have used the term "effective," "competent," and "adequate" inter-
changeably. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 506 F.2d 640, 645-46 (8th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975). For a discussion of the terms used, see notes 53-
55 infra and accompanying text.
4. The court did not outline petitioner's allegations of incompetence, but did state
that they raised a serious constitutional issue of effective assistance of counsel. Conse-
quently, the lower courts had erred in dismissing the petition without both appointment
of counsel and a hearing. The court reasoned that a hearing is necessary unless it is
clear that under no circumstances would petitioner be entitled to relief. Baxter v. Rose,
523 S.W.2d 930, 938-39 (Tenn. 1975).
An evidentiary hearing to determine the incompetence of counsel is required in many
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970). If the
challenge arises in an application for federal habeas relief, the federal statute, 28 U.S.C.
* 2255 (1970), applies:
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show
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Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals appointed counsel, but found
petitioner's allegations merely conclusory,5 refused to grant an eviden-
tiary hearing, and affirmed the dismissal.6 Imposing a new standard
to determine effectiveness of counsel, the Tennessee Supreme Court
reversed, remanded for an evidentiary hearing, and held: Article I,
section 9, of the Tennessee constitution and the sixth amendment to
the United States Constitution require that defendants in criminal cases
that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof
to be served upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon,
determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with re-
spect thereto.
Id.
The kinds of evidence admissible in competence hearings vary according to the juris-
diction. In federal courts, 28 U.S.C. § 2246 (1970), controls:
On application for a writ of habeas corpus, evidence may be taken orally
or by deposition, or in the discretion of the judge, by affidavit. If affidavits
are admitted any party shall have the right to propound written interrogatories
to the affiants, or to file answering affidavits.
Id. The District of Columbia Circuit considers other evidence if submitted by affidavit.
See, e.g., United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The rationale
is that "prejudice may not appear in the record precisely because counsel was ineffec-
tive." Bazelon, supra note 2, at 29. Other courts examine only the record. See, e.g.,
State v. Kahalewai, 54 Hawaii 28, 501 P.2d 977 (1972).
5. Courts have split on who has the burden of proof in a competency challenge,
but most place it on the defendant. See, e.g., Hussick v. State, 19 Ore. App. 915, 529
P.2d 938 (1974); In re Bousley, 130 Vt. 296, 292 A.2d 249 (1972); State v. Thomas,
- W. Va. -, 203 S.E.2d 445 (1974). One reason is that many jurisdictions presume
that members of the bar are competent. See, e.g., Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d 108 (7th
Cir. 1957); Kindle v. State, - Ind. App. -, 313 N.E.2d 721 (1974). Some courts have
even applied the presumption when the attorney under attack was not licensed to prac-
tice before the trial court. See, e.g., Farr v. United States, 314 F. Supp. 1125, 1132
(W.D. Mo. 1970), affd, 436 F.2d 975 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 947 (1971).
But see Berry v. Gray, 155 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. Ky. 1957).
Other courts shift the burden to the state once defendant makes out a prima facie case
of incompetence. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia requires the gov-
ernment to prove lack of prejudice once a defendant substantiates his initial allegations.
See United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also Coles
v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1968). Other jurisdictions require the state to prove
competency beyond reasonable doubt once the defendant makes a prima facie case. See,
e.g., Risher v. State, 523 P.2d 241 (Alas. 1974). See also Finer, Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel, 58 CoRNELL L. REv. 1077, 1080 (1973).
Almost every jurisdiction requires the incompetence to be prejudicial. See, e.g., Mc-
Queen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974); Risher v. State, supra. This position
accords with the "harmless constitutional error rule." See Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 20-21 (1967); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 92 (1963); State v. Thomas,
supra; Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN.
L. REv. 1175, 1239 (1970); Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent De-
fendant, 78 HAv. L. Rnv. 1434, 1435-37 (1965).
6. Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1976/iss3/7
Number 3] ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 505
be afforded legal assistance within the range of competence demanded
of attorneys in criminal cases.7
The sixth amendment, applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment,8 guarantees that "[in] all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right. . to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defense."9  Article I, section 9, of the Tennessee constitution con-
tains a similar guarantee, 10 "identical in import" under Tennessee
law." Both constitutional provisions require the state to afford counsel
not only at trial but at various other critical stages of a criminal prose-
cution.'12
7. Id. at 939. The court also held that this standard applied to both appointed
and privately retained counsel, rejecting the argument that a defendant who had retained
counsel could not plead incompetence. Id. at 938.
Some courts distinguish between defendants represented by appointed and retained
counsel by relying on a "principal-agent" rationale. Since the defendant hired the attor-
ney as his agent, the attorney's actions are imputed to the accused; he cannot complain
of inadequate representation. See Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1944). See
also Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction
Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 289 (1964). For a list of jurisdictions
adopting this rule, see Polur, Retained Counsel, Assigned Counsel: Why the Dichot-
omy?, 55 A.B.A.J. 254, 254 n.2 (1969). The Baxter court reasoned that if a man is
incompetent to represent himself at trial, he is also incompetent to evaluate his lawyer's
skills and representation. 523 S.W.2d at 938.
A number of jurisdictions have declined to permit defendants represented by retained
counsel to assert incompetence because the retained counsel is not an officer of the state.
Consequently, these courts reason there is no state action and hence no constitutional
deprivation. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953); People v. Austin, 23 Ill. App. 3d 520,
319 N.E.2d 306 (1974); Anderson v. Peyton, 209 Va. 798, 167 S.E.2d 111 (1969). For
a list of jurisdictions rejecting the state action theory, see Note, Assuring the Right to
an Adequately Prepared Defense, 65 J. Cnms. L.C. & P.S. 302, 312 n.117 (1974).
The Barter court rejected this argument on the wholly untenable theory that the sixth
amendment right to counsel is not necessarily dependent on state action. 523 S.W.2d
at 938. The federal guarantee of effective counsel, however, is relevant to state criminal
proceedings only because of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, see
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 350 (1963), which does require state action. The Bax-
ter result is nonetheless defensible. The criminal trial itself obviously constitutes state
action; the trial violates due process if defendant has ineffective counsel, whether ap-
pointed or retained.
The Baxter court also held that the state constitution guarantees the right to effective
counsel. 523 S.W.2d at 938. See note 10 infra and accompanying text.
8. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 350 (1963).
9. U.S. CONSr. amend. IV.
10. "That in all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath the right to be heard by
himself and his counsel .... " TEN. CONsT. art. I, § 9.
11. Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975).
12. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (right to counsel at sentencing hear-
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In Powell v. Alabama,'8 which established a fourteenth amendment
due process right to counsel in capital cases, the United States Supreme
Court recognized that inadequate representation may be the equivalent
of none, and held that the right to counsel implicitly requires that legal
assistance be effective.' 4  The Court established no constitutional
ing); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (accused entitled to counsel at post-
indictment indentification line-up); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to counsel
at juvenile proceedings if confinement may result); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) (person must be advised of right to counsel upon arrest); Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478 (1964) (accused has right to counsel at police interrogation); White V.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (counsel required at federal preliminary hearing); Doug-
las v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (indigent prisoners entitled to free counsel for
direct appeals). In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), the right to counsel
was extended to every defendant who faces possible imprisonment if convicted. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Powell stated that "the adversary system functions best and
most fairly only when all parties are represented by competent counsel." Id. at 65 (em-
phasis added).
Congress has recognized the importance of effective legal representation by enacting
the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964), as amended (Supp. II,
1972), which provides compensation and investigative expenses for attorneys represent-
ing indigents in federal court. See Margolin & Wagner, The Indigent Criminal Defend-
ant and Defense Services: A Search for Constitutional Standards, 24 HAsTI Ns LJ. 647
(1973); Note, The Indigent's Right to an Adequate Defense: Expert and Investiga-
tional Assistance in Criminal Proceedings, 55 CORNELL L. Rav. 632 (1970); Note, Dol-
lars and Sense of an Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 IowA L. REv. 249 (1970).
13. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
14. Under Powell due process in capital cases requires more than nominal represen-
tation: it requires "effective representation." Commenting on the appointment of the
entire bar of Scottsboro, Alabama, as defense counsel, Justice Sutherland stated "that the
duty is not discharged by an assignment at such time or under such circumstances as
to preclude the giving of effective aid in preparation and trial of the case." Id. at 71.
In Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940), the Court affirmed the principle that inef-
fective representation may amount to a denial of the right to counsel. Justice Black
wrote for the majority:
Mhe denial of opportunity for appointed counsel to confer, to consult with
the accused and to prepare his defense, could convert the appointment of coun-
sel into a sham and nothing more than a formal compliance with the Consti-
tution's requirement that an accused be given the assistance of counsel. The
C6nstitution's guarantee of assistance of counsel cannot be satisfied by mere
formal appointment.
Id. at 446. See also White v. Ragen, 342 U.S. 760 (1945). The Court went a step
further in Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), overturning Glasser's conviction
because the attorney also represented a codefendant whose interests conflicted with
Glasser's. Justice Murphy stated:
mhe Sixth Amendment contemplates that such assistance be untrammeled
and unimpaired.. . . If the right to the assistance of counsel means less than
this, a valued constitutional safeguard is substantially impaired.
Id. at 70. In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), the Court applied the sixth
amendment to all federal prosecutions.
In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), however, it held that due process does not
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standard for effective representation, however, stating merely that nom-
inal representation is insufficient to satisfy due process."
Until the mid-1960's, all federal and state courts determined the ef-
fectiveness of legal assistance according to the standard formulated by
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Diggs v. Welch: 6
Criminal convictions could be overturned for ineffective representation
only if counsel were so incompetent that the trial was a "farce and
mockery of justice."'17 Five federal circuits' 8 and approximately half
of the states' 9 continue to adhere to this test. These courts fear that
require counsel to be furnished in every criminal case. This stunted the growth of the
right to counsel in state courts until 1963, when Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 350
(1963), expressly overruled Betts. See Beany, The Right to Counsel: Past, Present and
Future, 49 VA. L. REV. 1150 (1963).
15. 287 U.S. at71.
16. 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
17. The court stated "[Tihe trial shocked the conscience of the court and made
the proceedings a farce and a mockery of justice." Id. at 670. The Tennessee Supreme
Court applied a similar test in State ex rel. Richmond v. Henderson, 222 Tenn. 597,
439 S.W.2d 263 (1969):
Incompetency of counsel such as to be a denial of due process and effective
representation by counsel must be such as to make the trial a farce, sham, or
mockery of justice.
Id. at 599, 439 S.W.2d at 264 (citations omitted).
The District of Columbia Circuit was one of the first jurisdictions to reconsider this
rule. In Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the court stated:
These words are not to be taken literally, but rather as a vivid description of
the principle that the accused has a heavy burden in showing the requisite un-
fairness.
Id. at 116 (footnote omitted). See also Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney,
427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967).
18. See Dunker v. Vinzant, 505 F.2d 503 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v. Yan-
ishefsky, 500 F.2d 1327 (2d Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Little v. Twomey, 477
F.2d 767 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1078 (1972); Johnson v. United States, 380
F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1967). For a discussion of the standard in the Eighth and Fourth
Circuits, see note 35 in!ra.
19. State v. Phillips, 16 Ariz. App. 174, 492 P.2d 423 (1972); Haynie v. State, 257
Ark. 542, 518 S.W.2d 492 (1975); Palmer v. Adams, 162 Conn. 316, 294 A.2d 297
(1972); Parker v. State, 295 So. 2d 312 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974); State v. Wozniak, 94
Idaho 312, 486 P.2d 1025 (1971); People v. Austin, 23 II. App. 3d 520, 319 N.E.2d
306 (1974); Greer v. State, - Ind. -, 321 N.E.2d 842 (1975); Winter v. State, 210
Kan. 597, 502 P.2d 733 (1972); State v. Flanagan, 254 La. 100, 222 So. 2d 872 (1969);
State v. LeBlanc, 290 A.2d 193 (Me. 1972); People v. Green, 42 Mich. App. 154, 201
N.W.2d 664 (1972); State v. O'Neill, 299 Minn. 60, 216 N.W.2d 822 (1974); Parham
v. State, 229 So. 2d 582 (Miss. 1969); State v. Noller, 142 Mont. 35, 381 P.2d 293
(1963); Warden v. Lischko, 90 Nev. 221, 523 P.2d 6 (1974); State v. Gillihan, 85 N.M.
514, 514 P.2d 33 (1973); State v. Sneed, 284 N.C. 606, 201 S.E.2d 867 (1974); State
v. Peoples, 28 Ohio App. 2d 162, 162 N.E.2d 463 (1971); State v. Lewis, 255 S.C. 466,
179 S.E.2d 616 (1971); Bonsal v. State, 502 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1973); Alires v. Turner,
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abandoning the farce and mockery standard would promote frivolous
appeals, 20 and discourage attorneys from accepting appointments to de-
fend indigents for fear of subsequently being adjudicated incompe-
tent2' or subjected to fines22 or civil malpractice suits. 23
22 Utah 2d 118, 449 P.2d 241 (1969); Anderson v. Peyton, 209 Va. 798, 167 S.E.2d 111
(1969).
20. Dictum in State v. Sneed, 284 N.C. 606, 613, 201 S.E.2d 867, 871 (1974), ex-
pressed concern over this problem: "to impose a less stringent rule would be to encour-
age convicted defendants to assert frivolous claims which could result in unwarranted
trial of their counsels." Judge Bazelon was willing to concede this:
mhe issue in effectiveness of counsel cases is not the culpability of the law-
yer but the constitutional right of the client. There will, no doubt, be many
ill-founded claims of ineffectiveness-there are now-but such claims are an
occupational hazard of the profession.
Bazelon, supra note 2, at 25. See Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel, 49 VA. L. Rv.
1531 (1963). A stringent test might also adversely effect trial tactics. Attorneys might
be overly cautious, or might even be deliberately incompetent to have convictions viti-
ated. See Norman v. United States, 100 F.2d 905 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 660
(1934); Kaus & Mullen, The Misguiding Hand of Counsel-Reflection on Criminal
Malpractice, 21 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 1191, 1198 n.118 (1974).
21. Concern about lawyers' reputations is misplaced. Truly inadequate repre-
sentation deserves no protection, and decent representation need not result in
a trial of the lawyer who provided it.
Bines, supra note 2, at 940 n.69. Courts have sometimes protected the identity of attor-
neys charged with incompetence. See Note, supra note 5, at 1450 n.109, citing United
States v. Re, 336 F.2d 306 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904 (1964) (opinion re-
ferred to counsel as Mr. "Z"), and Porter v. United States, 298 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1962)
(Mr. "Barrister"). See generally Grano, supra note 5.
22. Fines have been levied pursuant to FED. R. App. P. 46(c) for failing to appeal.
See, e.g., Bines, supra note 2, at 972 n.206, citing United v. Rivera, 473 F.2d 1372 (9th
Cir. 1972), and United States v. Smith, 436 F.2d 1130 (9th Cir. 1970).
23. Apparently no criminal defendant has ever successfully sued appointed counsel.
See, e.g., Sullens v. Carroll, 446 F.2d 1392 (5th Cir. 1971); Underwood v. Woods, 406
F.2d 910 (8th Cir. 1969); Jones v. Warlick, 364 F.2d 828 (4th Cir. 1966). See also
Comment, Liability of Court-Appointed Defense Counsel for Malpractice in Federal
Criminal Prosecutions, 57 IoWA L. REv. 1420 (1972) (discussion of Sullens and the im.
munity doctrine).
Bazelon concurs:
One [remedy] is the private malpractice suit brought by a defendant who has
suffered because of his attorney's inadequacy. When standards that clearly ar-
ticulate counsel's duty to his client are developed, such suits may be more prac-
tical, but whatever it may become, this form of action is not at all significant
now.
Bazelon, supra note 2, at 17.
A number of defendants have unsuccessfully attempted suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(3) (1970). For example, Mulligan v. Schlachter, 389 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1968), held
that § 1983:
provides a remedy only against one acting under color of state law. Safir, a
private attorney, does not fall within this category, despite the fact that he had
been appointed by the court.
Id. at 233.
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The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of the stand-
ard of competence required by the sixth amendment in criminal trials.
In McMann v. Richardson,24 however, the Court did discuss the caliber
of advice required for a defendant to enter a knowing and intelligent
guilty plea. -5 The Court held that a guilty plea was intelligent and thus
voluntary only if based on "reasonably competent" legal advice.28
"Reasonably competent" advice was defined as that within the "range
of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases."2 7
Some courts have applied the McMann "range of competence" rule
to all ineffective assistance claims. 28 Other courts rejecting the farce
24. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
25. Defendant alleged that his guilty plea was motivated by a coerced confession
that counsel advised would be admissible. The confession was made prior to Jackson
v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), which invalidated New York's confession procedures.
The Court held that counsel's failure to anticipate this decision did not constitute inef-
fective representation. 397 U.S. at 772.
26, In our view a defendant's plea of guilty based on reasonably competent ad-
vice is an intelligent plea not open to attack on the ground that counsel may
have misjudged the admissibility of the defendant's confession.
397 U.S. at 770 (footnote omitted).
27. Whether a plea of guilty is unintelligent and therefore vulnerable when mo-
tivated by a confession erroneously thought admissible in evidence depends as
an initial matter, not on whether a court would retrospectively consider coun-
sel's advice to be right or wrong, but on whether that advice was within the
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. On the one
hand, uncertainty is inherent in predicting court decisions; but on the other
hand defendants facing felony charges are entitled to the effective assistance
of competent counsel. Beyond this matter, we think for the most part, it
should be left to the good sense and discretion of the trial courts with the ad-
monition that if the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve
its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel,
and the judges should strive to maintain proper standards of performance by
attorneys who are representing defendants in their criminal cases in courts.
Id. at 770-71 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Accord, Tollett v. Henderson, 411
U.S. 258 (1973). But cf. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); 48 J. URBAN L.
989 (1971 ); 31 Omo ST. LJ. 852 (1970).
28. See State v. Kahalewai, 54 Hawaii 28, 501 P.2d 977 (1974) (effective counsel
does not mean errorless counsel, but counsel whose assistance is "within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases"). Accord, State v. Massey, 207
N.W,2d 777 (Iowa 1973); State v. Fleury, II1 N.H. 294, 282 A.2d 873 (1971).
Although not using the same terminology, some jurisdictions have developed a similar
concept. In Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736-37 (3d Cir. 1970), the court
stated:
[The standard of adequacy ... is the exercise of the customary skill and
knowledge which normally prevails at time and place. [What is required is
normal and not exceptional representation ....
Accord, Risher v. State, 523 P.2d 421 (Alas. 1974) (customary skill and knowledge of
attorneys fairly skilled in the criminal law); Commonwealth v. Saferian, - Mass. -,
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and mockery standard have adopted different approaches, defining the
standard of adequacy as "reasonably effective assistance,"20 "reason-
ably competent assistance, ' 30  "genuine and effective assistance,"'31
"conscientious and meaningful representation,"32 "a fair trial,"38  or
315 N.E.2d 878 (1974) (behavior of counsel falling measurably below that which might
be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer); State v. Leadinghorse, 192 Neb. 485, 222
N.W.2d 573 (1974) (at least as able as a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in
criminal law); State v. Anderson, 117 N.J. Super. 507, 285 A.2d 234 (Super. Ct. 1971)
(legal services equal to normal customary skill and knowledge); State v. Harper, 57 Wis.
2d 543, 205 N.W.2d 1 (1973) (ordinarily prudent lawyer, skilled and versed in criminal
law).
29. Two examples of this standard are Hudson v. Alabama, 493 F.2d 171 (5th Cir.
1974), and Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974). The Hudson Court
phrased the rule as:
Under the standards of this circuit, Hudson was entitled to counsel reasonably
likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance.
493 F.2d at 173. Beasley held:
[Tuhe assistance of counsel required under the Sixth Amendment is counsel
reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance ....
Defense counsel must perform at least as well as a lawyer with ordinary train-
ing and skill in the criminal law and must conscientiously protect his client's
interest, undeflected by conflicting considerations.
491 F.2d at 696. The language in Beasley is confusing since the "ordinary training and
skill" terminology is similar to the "normal range of competence" standard. This results
in a mixture of tests. Ordinary training and skill also implies that the "reasonableness"
of counsel's actions is to be measured by the performance of the average criminal de-
fense lawyer under the "reasonably effective assistance" test. Tennessee approved the
Beasley approach in Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975).
30. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("reasonably
competent assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent conscientious advocate").
31. See Harris v. State, 293 A.2d 291 (Del. 1972) (genuine and effective legal as-
sistance); Green v. Warden, 3 Md. App. 266, 238 A.2d 920 (1968) (genuine and effec-
tive legal assistance); State v. Goode, 84 S.D. 369, 171 N.W.2d 733 (1969) (adequate
and effective assistance). This standard, however, only restates the issue; the level of
representation to which defendants are entitled is still unclear. See notes 53-55 infra
and accompanying text.
32. State v. Desroches, 110 R.I. 497, 293 A.2d 913 (1972).
33. Three states measure effectiveness by whether the accused received a "fair trial."
Missouri defines the test simply:
[Mf the action (or inaction) of counsel were of such character as to result
in a substantial deprivation of a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial,
relief should be granted.
Thomas v. State, 516 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974). Accord, In re Bousely,
130 Vt. 296, 292 A.2d 249 (1972) (a fair and impartial trial upon the merits); State
v. Robinson, 75 Wash. 2d 230, 233, 450 P.2d 180 (1969), quoting State v. Thomas, 71
Wash. 2d 470, 429 P.2d 231 (1967) (was the accused "afforded an effective representa-
tion and a fair and impartial trial?"). See Note, Incompetency of Counsel, 25 BAY. L.
REv. 299 (1974); Comment, Effective Representation-An Evasive Substantive Notion
Masquerading as Procedure, 39 WASH. L. REv. 819 (1964).
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'any reasonable basis" for counsel's actions.84  Some courts have nom-
inally adhered to the farce and mockery rule while actually applying
a more rigorous standard.35 These courts reason that incompetent
34. The leading case advocating this standard is Commonwealth ex rel. Washington
v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967):
Our inquiry ceases and counsel's assistance is deemed constitutionally effective
once we are able to conclude that the particular course chosen by counsel had
some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client's interests.
Id. at 604, 235 A.2d at 352 (emphasis original). Alabama, Oregon, and West Virginia
all gauge effectiveness by this test. Taylor v. State, 291 Ala. 756, 287 So. 2d 901
(1973); Rook v. Cupp, 17 Ore. App. 205, 526 P.2d 605 (1974); State v. Thomas, -
W. Va. -, -. 203 S.E.2d 445, 461 (1974). The West Virginia test apparently rests
in part on the general reputation of the challenged attorney. - W. Va. at -, 203
S.E.2d at 461. Courts seeking to clarify or elaborate their standards often employ a
mixture of approaches. See note 29 supra.
35. California courts hold that a trial is a sham and farce whenever counsel's inad-
vertance or action renders a crucial defense unavailable to the defendant. People v.
Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963). In People v. Thomas,
43 Cal. App. 3d 862, 869, 118 Cal. Rptr. 226, 230 (1974) (emphasis added), the court
stated:
When challenging the competence of counsel, the defendant must affirmatively
show that the omissions of defense counsel involved a critical issue, and that
the omissions cannot be explained on the basis of any knowledgeable choice
of tactics.
See Comment, Standards to Guarantee Effective Assistance of Counsel, 8 SANTA CLARA
LAw. 108 (1967).
The Eighth Circuit also uses a modified "farce and mockery" test. See Cardarella
v. United States, 375 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1967). In McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d
207 (8th Cir. 1974), the court noted:
Stringent as the "mockery of justice" standard may seem, we have never in-
tended it to be used as a shibboleth to avoid a searching evaluation of possible
constitutional violations; nor has it been so used in this circuit. It was not
intended that the "mockery of justice" standard be taken literally, but rather
that it be employed as an embodiment of the principle that a petitioner must
shoulder a heavy burden in proving unfairness.
Id. at 214. In Johnson v. United States, 506 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S, 973 (1975), the court appeared to endorse the range of competence test:
The standard to be applied in assessing a claim of ineffective or inadequate
representation is based on the particulars of each case and is not easily reduced
to any formula ....
' * ' A more appropriate nomenclature for the standard would be to test the
degree of competence prevailing among those licensed to practice before the
bar.
Id. at 645-46. Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit recently affirmed the "farce and mock-
ery" language of Cardarella and the McQueen burden requirement in Sheril v. Wyrick,
524 F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 1975). For a discussion of McQueen and the Eighth Circuit
standard, see Note, The Right to Effective Counsel in Criminal Trials: Judicial Stand-
ards and the California Bar Association Response, 5 GoLDEN GATE L. R.v. 499 (1975).
The author concluded that the Eighth Circuit's standard is actually closer to the reason-
able competence standard than to the farce and mockery test. Id. at 507.
The Fourth Circuit standard is unclear. In Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.
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legal representation upsets the adversary system critical to an effective
trial," and believe this concern overrides the problems of promoting
frivolous appeals and discouraging appointed counsel.81
1968), the court reversed a conviction using language that suggested a "reasonable com-
petence" standard. In Bennett v. Maryland, 425 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1970), however,
the court denied relief because counsel's errors did not reduce the trial to a "farce."
Since Coles involved pretrial preparation while Bennett challenged trial tactics, the cases
might be reconciled by concluding that the Fourth Circuit applies a different test for
preparation than for trial conduct.
Two other jurisdictions have applied the "farce and mockery" test to distinguish prep-
aration from trial tactics. In Vaughan v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1974),
the Kentucky Court of Appeals stated:
The rule to which the judge referred is one that relates to trial performance
by the attorney and not to the matter of time for preparation for trial. Our
cases do not hold that the failure to allow an attorney adequate time for
preparation for trial is a ground for relief only if the attorney's conduct of the
trial is so hopelessly bad as to make the trial a farce.
Id. at 771 (emphasis original). For a discussion of the Vaughan case, see Note, Ken-
lucky's Standard for Ineffective Counsel: A Farce and A Mockery, 63 KY. L.J. 803,
821 (1975). In People v. Bennett, 29 N.Y.2d 462, 467, 280 N.E.2d 637, 639, 329
N.Y.S.2d 801, 804 (1972) the New York Court of Appeals held:
[W]here . . . the record unequivocally demonstrates a complete lack of in-
vestigation or preparation whatever on the only possible defense available, the
lawyer, far from providing the sort of assistance which the Constitution guar-
antees to the most lowly defendant, has, in truth, rendered the "trial a farce
and a mockery of justice."
Wallace v. Kern, 392 F. Supp. 834 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), illustrates the importance ac-
corded to pretrial preparation. Wallace issued an injunction limiting the caseload of
each legal aid society attorney to 40 indicted felony defendants awaiting trial, even
though "[t]here was no proof. .. that the representation of any defendant on an actual
trial or plea has been 'farcical,' one of the tests used to upset a conviction." Id. at 844.
The court reasoned that the lawyers were so overburdened by their caseload that they
were unable to make the decisions necessary to render adequate representation. Id. at
845.
36. Chief Justice Burger has compared the criminal justice system to a tripod, with
the court, the prosecutor, and the defense counsel as the legs. Unless all are equally
strong the imbalance renders the system ineffectual. Judicial Conference, Minimum
Standards for Criminal Justice, 49 F.R.D. 347, 360 (10th Cir. 1969). For discussion
of Chief Justice Burger's views on the effectiveness of counsel issue see Lamb, The Mak-
ing of a Chief Justice: Warren Burger on Criminal Procedure, 1956-1969, 60 CORNELL
L. Rv. 743, 778-786 (1975).
37. There is growing awareness that criminal defendants are not receiving adequate
representation. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970); Bazelon,
supra note 2. Chief Justice Burger believes that one-third to one-half of attorneys rep-
resenting felony defendants are not qualified to "render fully adequate representation."
Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy, 42 FoRD. L. Rnv. 227, 234 (1973). Judge Baze-
Ion agreed:
[Wihat I have seen in 23 years on the bench leads me to believe that a great
many-if not most-indigent defendants do not receive the effective assistance
of counsel guaranteed by the 6th Amendment.
Bazelon, supra note 2, at 2. See also Wilkey, A Bar Examination for Federal Courts,
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The leading case adopting the "reasonable competence" standard is
United States v. DeCoster,3 8 in which the District of Columbia Circuit
relied in part on McMann to repudiate the "farce and mockery" stand-
ard it had created. In an opinion by Judge Bazelon, the court held:
"[A] defendant is entitled to the reasonably competent assistance of
an attorney acting as his diligent conscientious advocate."3 9 The court
outlined specific conduct required of counsel to ensure effective repre-
sentation and instructed lower courts and attorneys to look to the Amer-
ican Bar Association Standards for the Defense Function (Defense
Function Standards) for guidance. 0
The Defense Function Standards4 establish norms for counsel's ac-
tions in the following areas: access to counsel, lawyer-client relation-
ship, investigation and preparation, control and direction of litigation,
disposition without trial, trial, and postconviction remedies. 42  For ex-
ample, the standard concerning investigation and pretrial preparation
states that counsel should make a "prompt investigation of the circum-
stances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant
to guilt and degree of guilt or penalty."43
61 A.B.A.J. 1091 (1975); Wolkin, More on a Better Way to Keep Lawyers Competent,
61 A.B.A.J. 1064, 1064 (1975); Note, The Right to Effective Counsel in Criminal
Trials: Judicial Standards and the California Bar Association Response, 5 GoLDEN GATE
L REv. 449 (1975).
38. 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See note 30 supra.
39. 487 F.2d at 1201.
40. Id. at 1203. For DeCoster's handling of the burden of proof issue, see note
5 supra.
41. See generally Clark, The American Bar Association Standards: Prescription for
an Ailing System, 47 No-RE DAME LAW. 429 (1972). The American Bar Association
sponsored this project, begun in 1963, in an effort to improve the criminal justice system.
Committees consisting of federal and state trial and appellate judges, prosecutors, de-
fense, and other lawyers, and law professors drafted the guidelines.
42. ABA STANDARDs RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
Compilation, 101-36 (1974).
43. ABA DEFENSE FUNCTON STNDA 4.1. Standard 8.6 of this section pertains
to a lawyer's role when presented with a challenge to the competence of another lawyer:
Challenges to the effectiveness of counsel.
(a) If a lawyer, after investigation, is satisfied that another lawyer who
served in an earlier phase of the case did not provide effective assistance, he
should not hesitate to seek relief for the defendant on that ground.
(b) If a lawyer, after investigation, is satisfied that another lawyer who
served in an earlier phase of the case provided effective assistance, he should
so advise his client and he may decline to proceed further.
(c) A lawyer whose conduct of a criminal case is drawn into question is
entitled to testify concerning the matters charged and is not precluded from
disclosing the truth concerning the accusation, even though this involves reveal-
ing matters which were given in confidence.
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In Baxter v. Rose,44 the Tennessee Supreme Court reviewed the de-
cisions of each federal circuit and noted the trend toward a more rigor-
ous standard of effective representation.4  The court reasoned that
legal assistance need not be so incompetent as to render a trial a "farce
and mockery" in order to violate the sixth amendment right to coun-
sel.46 The "normal range of competence" test was deemed the "better
standard. 14r The court did not consider it "necessary or proper" to
enunciate a precise formula and was "content to leave the matter rest-
ing on a foundation of reasonable competence as tested by the author-
ities as herein set out."45  The court stated the "authorities" were to
be the Defense Function Standards, and the "duties and criteria as set
forth in DeCoster" and Beasley v. United States.49
The Tennessee Supreme Court's rejection of the "farce and mock-
ery" standard is commendable.50  The court's opinion is not. The
opinion contains neither the reasons for adopting the "range of
competence" test, nor an explanation of why it is superior to those
44. 523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 1975).
45. Id. at 932-36. In Morgan v. Hogan, 494 F.2d 1220 (lst Cir. 1974), the court
indicated a willingness to change standards.
46. 523 S.W.2d at 936.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974).
50. Since every defendant is entitled to a fair trial, the farce and mockery standard
does not serve the goals of the legal system. Trials become unfair before they become
a farce and a mockery.
Justice Black long opposed standards couched in terms of "mockery of justice" or
"shocking to the conscience of the court." In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175
(1952) (dissenting opinion), Black stated:
I believe that faithful adherence to the specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights insures a more permanent protection of individual liberty than that
which can be afforded by the nebulous standards stated by the majority.
What the majority hold is that the Due Process Clause empowers this Court
to nullify any state law if its application "shocks the conscience" or offends
"a sense of justice" ....
Judge Bazelon also severely criticized this standard: "The mockery test requires such
a minimal level of performance from counsel that it is itself a mockery of the sixth
amendment." Bazelon, supra note 2.
In a system of justice in which defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt the "farce and mockery" standard is inconsistent with the
system of constitutional safeguards. Society gives the benefit of any doubt based on rea-
sonableness to the accused. It is inconsistent to place a heavy burden on the defendant




adopted in other jurisdictions.5 More importantly, the court failed
to establish a precise and workable constitutional standard; it merely
relied on the "generalities of McMann" and referred lower courts
to DeCoster, Beasley, and the Defense Function Standards. 52 DeCoster
and Beasley enunciate the test for effective assistance in differ-
ent terms; and both differ slightly from the standard enunciated
in Baxter. DeCoster requires "reasonably competent assistance,"53
while Beasley demands "reasonably effective assistance."5 4  The court
failed to differentiate these two general standards, or to relate them
to the more specific criteria of the Defense Function Standards. The
consequence is a test of competence which cannot be easily understood
or applied; courts and counsel remain confused on precisely what is the
minimum standard expected of defense counsel.
Because effectiveness may be the functional equivalent of competence,
there may be no practical difference between Beasley and DeCoster.
The inability to define precisely or to distinguish between these terms
may be the crux of the problem of defining a constitutional standard
for legal assistance.5 5 Baxter does nothing to resolve this ambiguity
and in fact perpetuates it by simultaneously adopting several slightly
differing standards.
Although not well articulated, the Baxter court's reliance on Mc-
Mann and the Defense Function Standards is well placed. The Mc-
Mann rule of "reasonable competence" probably governs the case.
McMann held that an attorney's advice on guilty pleas must reach that
level, "6 and advice is functionally indistinguishable from other action
demanded of an attorney.17  Accepting McMann as controlling, courts
51. See notes 29-34 supra.
52. 523 S.W.2d at 938.
53. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
54. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974).
55. See note 3 supra.
56. See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.
57. A lawyer's duty extends equally to all phases of his professional capacity. The
American Bar Association defines the role of defense counsel:
The primary role of counsel is to act as champion for his client. In this ca-
pacity he is the equalizer, the one who places each litigant as nearly as possible
on an equal footing under the substantive and procedural law under which he
is tried.
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note
42, at 109. The ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsIBImrry, EC 7-19, defines coun-
sel's position in a similar manner:
Mhe advocate, by his zealous preparation and presentation of facts and law,
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must resolve what conduct satisfies the "range of competence." The
ABA Defense Function Standards are an excellent starting point. The
Standards provide specific, uniform guidelines readily available to both
counsel and judge.58 Although the ABA disavows use of the Standards
to evaluate the performance of trial counsel when challenged on ap-
peal,59 a number of courts have recognized them as authoritative.0°  In
most instances the Standards should provide a clear guide. If the
Standards do not address a specific course of conduct, the reviewing
court must examine counsels' actions on an ad hoc basis, perhaps ap-
plying a "reasonable basis" test to the challenged action."1
A strict constitutional standard of adequate representation is a na-
tural and necessary consequence of the expansion of the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel. Tennessee is another jurisdiction that has found
it constitutionally impermissible to maintain the farce and mockery
standard, albeit for shallow and confusing reasons. In well-reasoned
and articulate opinions, courts should follow the Baxter result and de-
fine effective representation with reference to McMann and the ABA
Defense Function Standards.62
enables the tribunal to come to the hearing with an open and neutral mind and
to render impartial judgments. The duty of a lawyer to his client and his duty
to the legal system are the same: to represent his client zealously within the
bounds of the law.
58. See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
59. IFlhe standard is intended as a guide to honorable professional conduct
and performance. These standards are not intended as criteria for the judicial
evaluation of the effectiveness of counsel to determine the validity of a convic-
tion; they may not be relevant in such judicial evaluation depending upon all
the circumstances.
ABA DEFENSE FuNCTON STANDARD 1.1 (f).
60. See United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (1973); Taylor v. State, 291 Ala.
756, 287 So. 2d 901 (1973); State v. Harper, 57 Wis. 2d 543, 205 N.W.2d 1 (1973).
Judge Bazelon approved the use of these criteria, stating: "those minimal standards
should, in turn, be expanded and refined on a case by case basis, as the court gains ex-
perience with their application." Bazelon, supra note 2, at 32. See Clark, supra note
41, at 435.
61. See note 34 supra.
62. A number of other methods have been implemented to improve criminal de-
fense representation. The United States District Court for Maryland provides defense
counsel with a checklist of functions to be performed. Report on Criminal Justice Act,
Form D, 36 F.R.D. 277, 338 (D. Md. 1965). Professor Grano supports a similar idea
recommending that, in order to prod counsel into providing better representation, counsel
file work sheets detailing the time and efforts spent on the case. Grano, supra note 5, at
1241. The District of Columbia has an Advisory Board of criminal lawyers with the pow-
er to suspend attorneys from eligibility for appointment if found incompetent. Bazelon,
supra note 2, at 17.
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